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Board Hosts 
A.B.A. Advisor 
in St. Paul 
DANFORTH'S BRIEFS CITED 
Assistant Dean Honored 
by Charles R. Hall 
On October 17, 1963, William 
:\Iitchell College of Law underwent 
a periodic inspection by Mr. John 
G. H ervey, advisor to the Section 
of Legal Education and Admis-
sions to the Bar of the American 
Bar Association. 
On July 17, 1963, at the St. Paul Athletic Club, William B. 
The inspection consists of exam-
ination of school records, discus-
sions with the Dean and faculty , 
file checks, and, sometimes, visits 
to the classrooms for observation. 
Danforth, Assistant Dean and Professor of Civil Procedure and 
Legal Writing at William Mitchell College of Law, was presented 
the ACHIEVEMENT CERTIFICATE of the Bench and Bar. The 
award was made at the general meeting of the Legal Publications 
Committee by its chairman, William J. Dunn. The award is made 
annually "to the person or organization making the most outstand-
ing contribution to the official bar journal in the preceding year." 
On the evening of October 17, 
l\:Ir. Hervey met with the William 
Mitchell Board of Trustees for 
their regular dinner meeting. There 
he was able to observe the Board 
carrying on with its routine busi-
ness. 
Also honoring Dean Danforth at the meeting were the Minne-
sota State Bar Association officers: Philip Neville, President; 
Charles R. Murnane, President Elect; and Timothy P. Quinn, 
Treasurer. 
On October 18, a luncheon was 
held in honor of Mr. Hervey at 
the Minnesota Club in St. Paul , 
attended by the members of the 
Board of Trustees, members of the 
faculty, members of the Professional 
Responsibilities staff, and members 
of the Moot Court staff. These 
groups included, along with many 
other distinguished men, Minne-
sota Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Oscar R . Knutson and Associate 
Justices W . F . Rogosheske and Rob-
ert J . Sheran; Judge John B. San-
born; Judge John W. Graff; Judge 
Ronald E. Hachey; and William H. 
Oppenheimer. Also represented at the 
luncheon were the Minnesota State 
Bar Assoc.iation, by its president 
Philip Neville; the Hennepin County 
Bar Association, by its president 
Thomas E. Sands; the Ramsey Coun-
ty Bar Association by its pres:dent 
Irving Gotlieb; and the William 
Mitchell Board of Trustees by its 
president Andrew N. Johnson and 
Board members Judge Arthur A. 
Stewart, Judge Albin S. Pearson, 
and Cyrus Rachie. 
Dean Danforth and Ronald P. Smith, Projects Chairman of the 
L egal Publications Committee, met about a year and a half ago 
and planned a project for the law school to perform in order to 
be of service to the state bar and bench. As a result of these 
meetings, they decided that they would attempt a monthly sum-
mary of recent Supreme Court Decisions. The series was to be 
edited by Dean Danforth and was to be on a trial basis. Dean 
Danforth states, "Our objective was to serve the active practicing 
lawyer by getting summaries of the recent decisions into his hands 
* * * * * 
Also present at the luncheon were 
Lee H. Slater, president, Wayne 
Davies, executive vice-president. 
and Hobart !\I. Yates, manager of 
the Law School Department, all 
of West Publishing Company. 
William J. Dunn, '31, Chairman, Public Relations Committee, presents 
Achievement Certificate to William B. Danforth, Assistant Dean, William 
Mitchell College of Law. 
Water Law Seminar Provides Interest 
and Information to Area Lawyers 
by D. Wayne Snyder 
The idea of establishing an Institute on Water 
Law was conceived in 1960 by Dean Stephen R. 
Curtis of the William Mitchell College of Law. 
His interest in a relatively unknown aspect of the 
law and the efforts of the Planning Committee 
resulted in the Institute that was presented at 
William Mitchell from October 9, 1963 through 
November 13, 196.3. 
The opening session on "Fundamentals of the 
Occurrence of Water" was conducted by Mr. 
Philip Neville, President of the Minnesota State 
Bar Association; Mr. Andrew N. Johnson, Presi-
dent of the Board of Trustees, William Mitchell 
College of Law; Mr. Herbert A. Fleuck, State 
Conservationist of the U. S. Soil Conservation 
Service and a member of the Planning Commit-
tee; and Mr. George E. Loughland, Chairman of 
the Minnesota Water Resources Board, also a 
member of the Planning Committee. The material 
covered was primarily discussed by Dr. George 
M. Schwartz, consulting geologist and former 
Chairman of the Department of Geology of the 
University of Minnesota. Dr. Schwartz was a 
member of the Planning Committee as well. 
The sessions that followed covered "Theories of 
Water Law," conducted by Mr. Raymond A. 
Haik of Erickson, Popham, Haik, & Schnobrich, 
and a member of the Planning Committee; "Legal 
Problems in the Use and Management of Surface. 
Water," by Mr. Virgil C. Herrick of Weaver, 
Talle & H errick, and former Executive Secretary 
of the Minnesota Resources Board, and member 
of the Planning Committee; "Legal Problems 
Relating to Ground Water," conducted by Mr. 
Haik; "The Role of Federal, State, and Local 
Agencies in the Management of Water," dis-
cussed by Mr. Wayne H. Olson, Commissioner of 
Conservation and a member of the Planning Com-
mittee in conjunction with Mr. Francis J. Murray, 
Deputy Attorney General and Advisor to the 
Minnesota Department of Conservation, and Mr. 
Herrick; and "An Outsider's Views of the Law-
yers' R esponsibilities and Opportunities Under 
Present Minnesota Water Law" and "What 
Changes in Minnesota Water Law are Desirable" 
presented by Mr. Harold H. Ellis, a Madison, 
Wisconsin attorney and Mr. Cletus D. Howard, 
an attorney from Eau Claire, Wisconsin. 
Other members of the Planning Committee 
were Dean Curtis; Mr. William B. Danforth, 
Assistant Dean of William Mitchell; Mr. Wil-
liam A. Green, Professor of Law at William 
Mitchell; and Mr. Douglas R. Heidenrich, Assist-
ant and Dean of William Mitchell. 
as soon as possible. Then if something proved of interest to him 
in one of his current cases he could pursue the subject further." 
Since many of the summaries reach the attorneys before the 
advance sheets do, the series has proven very successful and will 
be continued in the future. 
Each week Dean Danforth reads the five or more decisions that 
come down, and at the end of the month he edits them to fit 
the pages allotted to them. They are then published in the Bench 
and Bar magazine. Dean Danforth plans to continue this project, 
but _if the case load should become too heavy he will seek help 
from others on the William Mitchell Staff. 
Mr. Danforth is married and lives in Edina, Minnesota. Besides 
his Bench and Bar work he is a full time Assistant Dean at 
William Mitchell, and teaches third year courses on Civil Procedure 
and Legal Writing. He is a member of the Minnesota, Iowa, and 
American Bar Associations, and is admitted to practice in the 
Federal District Courts of the Northern and Southern Districts of 
Iowa as well as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
He has a 25-year-old son who practices law in Anoka, Minnesota. 
His 23-year-old daughter is a graduate of the University of Iowa 
and is now completing work toward her education degree at the 
University of Minnesota. 
Three West Officials 
Get Honorary Degrees 
by John E. McKendrick 
The College of St. Thomas Ar-
mory was the site of the 1963 Wil-
liam Mitchell College of Law com-
mencement exercises last June 11th. 
Highlight of the evening program 
was an address by the Hon. J. Ed-
ward Lumbard, Chief Judge of the 
United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, which preceded 
the conferring of the Bachelor of 
Laws degree on 76 seniors. 
An innovation in the proceedings 
this past spring was the presentation 
of honorary degrees to three men 
from West. Publishing Company: 
Mr. Homer P. Clark, 95-year-old 
former president of the company; 
l\1r. Lee H. Slater, current president; 
and Mr. Harvey T . Reid, chairman 
of the board. Recalling the decision 
to make the presentations, Dean 
Stephen R. Curtis noted that "the 
participation of these three men in 
the commencement exercises not 
only represented an acknowledge-
ment of their long-standing personal 
interest in the development of Wil-
liam Mitchell as an outstanding law 
school, but also the efforts and con-
cern extended in the past by West 
Publishing Company." 
Following the presentation of hon-
orary degrees, l\1r. Andrew N. John-
son, President of the Board of 
Trustees of William Mitchell, pre-
sided at the conferment for grad-
uates. Seven men, Robert F. Berger, 
Gene P. Bradt, Wayne Paul Dor-
dell, James Henry Malecki, Raphael 
Joseph Miller, William G. Stocks, 
and Russell Leo Streefland received 
their degrees cum laude. 
In his commencement address to 
the graduates and to some 1,000 ad-
ditional persons who attended the 
ceremony, Judge Lumbard empha-
sized the enormous demands that 
will be brought to bear on the young 
lawyer of today, as he attempts to 
cope with the many and complex 
facets of the society in which he 
lives. Specifically, he cited the prob-
lems in such areas as civil rights, 
due process in criminal cases, fed-
eral-state relations, and judicial ad-
ministration. 
Attention was also directed to the 
history of the Republic, and the 
overwhelming number of men of 
prurn;uence and distinction who re-
ceived their baptism into the public 
life through the practice of law. 
Judge Lumbard concluded his ex-
cellent address with a plea to the 
graduates that they never lose their 
perspective nor the knowledge that 





New year, new leaders, new plans 
- William Mitchell Law Wives are 
back in action. New officers are 
president, Mrs . Richard Arvold; 
vice president, Mrs. Dan Meany; 
recording secretary, Mrs. Perry Wil-
liams; corresponding secretary, Mrs. 
James Hall; treasurer, Mrs. Fred 
Long; social chairman, Mrs. Donald 
Sjostrom; public relations, Mrs. 
Floyd Hillstrom. 
At the October meeting Mrs. 
Marion Mason, attorney and wife of 
the Honorable Milton C. Mason of 
Mankato, presented a delightful 
speech. November brought Mr. Ed-
ward J. Drury, a 1960 graduate of 
William Mitchell; his topic: "Atti-
tudes and Responsibilities of Law-
yer's Wives in Criminal Cases." In 
December there was a demonstra-
tion of Christmas decorations. 
A dance and style show will be 
sponsored by the Law Wives, the 
proceeds to go to the William 
Mitchell Scholarship Fund. 
A luncheon style show, arranged 
by Mrs. John Frost, will be held 
at the Boulevard Cafe in Golden 
Valley on Saturday, February 29, 
at 1: 30 p .m. The show will feature 
ladies' apparel and some children's 
fashions from Lancer's Inc., all 
modeled by Law Wives and their 
children. 
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EDITORIALS 
God and Red Wing 
KNOW YOUR TRUSTEES 
Circuit Judge Blackmun 
Reflects Varied Background 
by John E. McKendrick 
"For the young law-school grad-
uate striving to succeed, there is 
no substitute for hard work; in fact, 
more work than he can possibly 
handle." Standing by themselves, 
these words are generally received 
as little more than sound advice. 
But coming from Harry A. Black-
mun, Judge of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, Eighth Circuit, and long-
standing member of the William 
Mitchell Board of Trustees, they 
are taken more seriously and repre-
sent a first principle of action for 
everything he has ever attempted. 
not only because it gives him con-
fidence in his own ability, but also 
because there is no better means 
to gain a knowledge of basic human 
psychology." 
Although Judge Blackmun had 
once expressed a desire to remain 
at the same job all of his life, 1949 
marked the first of two major 
changes in his legal career. In that 
year, he became resident counsel 
for the Mayo Clinic, a position 
which he held until his appointment 
to the federal bench in 1959. 
On October 29, 1963, the School Board of Red Wing, Minnesota 
adopted a policy that eliminated religion from school sponsored baccalau-
reate service, Easter programs, and Christmas pageants. Needless to say, 
the policy is a controversial one. It has its basis in the recent Supreme 
Court decision on school prayers and Bible readings. Many observers say 
it is an honest attempt to abide by that decision, while others feel that 
it is a hastily adopted policy that surpasses that objective. 
Relatively small in stature, he 
does not immediately convey the 
impression one might have of a 
judge. A brief exchange of words, 
however, removes the superficiality 
of a first glance and reveals a quiet 
spoken man, with a certain debo-
naire quality to his personality and, 
most important, a finely honed in-
tellect. 
About the time the Judge joined 
the staff at Mayo, he married, and 
then moved to Rochester, where he 
has resided ever since. 
Judge Blackmun's first contact 
with William Mitchell may prob-
ably be traced to the period from 
1935-41, when he was an instructor 
at the old St. Paul College of Law. 
Citing that period as being "a 
thousand years ago," the Judge 
remembers teaching Real Property. 
He also recalls that when he sug-
gested that a course in Taxation 
be introduced, the "normal" pro-
cedure in such cases was followed, 
and he was assigned to teach it. 
Judge Harry Blackmun 
Specifically referring to William 
Mitchell, Judge Blackmun dis-
cussed its growth and noted that 
"much of the excellent reputation 
that it has attained may be traced 
to the constant interest in the 
school displayed by members of 
the practicing bar in the area." 
The proper guidelines on school and religion are not easily established. 
However, this writer believes one basic factor that can be established is 
consistency. 
To eliminate religion from Christmas and Easter while still maintain-
ing school ceremonies in recognition of the occasion is not only incon-
sistent, but even illogical. Christmas and Easter have their very origin in 
belief in Christ; they are not merely commercial festive holidays. To 
remove religion from them is to remove them in their entirety, which 
would result in a necessary discontinuance of any observance whatsoever. 
It is inconsistency such as this that cannot allow decisions of such magni-
tude to be made in haste. Red Wing, after the October adoption of such 
a policy, reviewed it in its entirety and did, in fact, allow religion its 
proper place in the 1963 Christmas program. This was, at least, a step 
toward consistency. 
The Supreme Court decision must be followed, but the extent to which 
it is successfully carried out depends upon the thought and time that is 
given with an emphasis upon consistency. Our society of varying peoples 
demands that this be so. 
-D.W.S. 
Dallas and Due Process 
The American Bar Association, remote but vital ancestor of this news-
paper, suffers from its own enormity. Because its ranks are filled with 
members of every possible legal, political, and philosophical persuasion, 
it often, understandably, finds itself straddling many issues. This condi-
tion is not blameworthy; rather it is inescapable. 
It is doubly refreshing, then, when the Association speaks both firmly 
and with eminent good sense. In the December issue of the American 
Bar News, the monthly newsletter of the Association, the Board _of 
Governors has published a statement "deploring" the proposal to tele:v1se 
the trial of Jack Ruby, accused murderer of Lee Harvey Oswald. Smee 
the trial judge has recently ruled against that request, that part of the 
ABA's statement is now moot. 
But the statement contains other matter that is of more lasting inter-
est. The board was most severely critical of the "public disclosures of 
'evidence' " against Oswald which "would have made it extremely diffi-
cult to impanel an unprejudiced jury. (The disclosures) could have pre-
vented any lawful trial of Oswald due to the difficulty of finding jurors 
who had not been prejudiced by these public statements." 
Official laxity reaped its own punishment, the statement further 
points out, in the killing of Oswald "literally in the arms of police o~-
cers." The Board decries the "tendency of some law enforcement authori-
ties as well as some defense counsel to try their cases outside the court-
room." 
We applaud the Association and its board for their strong words. 
Surely the cumulative effect of the Dallas officials' many television ap-
pearances influenced the conclusion of any viewers. Closing arguments, 
reviewing the "evidence," belong in the courtroom. Let us work to keep 
them there. 
-A.E.M. 
"In a time when all 
men are properly con-
cerned lest nations, 
forgetting law, reason 
and moral existence, 
turn to mutual destruc-
tion, we have all the 
more need to work for 
a day when law may 
govern nations as it 
does men within na-
tions." 
- John F. Kennedy 
1917-1963 
Judge Blackmun's background 
lends some credence to his philos-
ophy. Although born in Illinois, he 
spent virtually his entire childhood 
"overlooking the Bluff" on St. 
Paul's East Side, at that time re-
garded as a "rough" neighborhood. 
It must have had some redeeming 
attributes, however, because a defi-
nite twinkle enters the judge's eyes 
when he recalls those years. Per-
haps one of his favorite memories 
is the beginning of a lifetime friend-
ship with Judge Warren E. Burger, 
'32, of the U.S. Court of Appeals in 
Washington, D.C. 
Whatever the true nature of the 
East Side, it must have provided a 
stark contrast to the seven years 
Judge Blackmun spent at Harvard 
after his graduation from high 
school. The first four were spent as 
an undergraduate and resulted in 
summa cum laude honors, a positive 
indication of the high intelligence 
and drive possessed by this man. 
At that point in his life, the 
Judge notes that he seriously toyed 
with the notion of going into medi-
cine. But his stronger and more 
varied interests led him instead to 
choose the law, a decision which he 
has never regretted. 
Three more years gave Judge 
Blackmun his LL.B., and he then 
returned to his home in Minnesota. 
Upon being admitted to the bar in 
1932, he took a job as law clerk 
for Eighth Circuit Judge John B. 
Sanborn, '07, the very man he was 
to replace on the same bench 27 
years later. 
Completing an apprenticeship of 
17 months with Judge Sanborn, 
Judge Blackmun settled down to 
the practice of law with the Dorsey 
firm of Minneapolis. It was there, in 
the "rat race" as he smilingly calls 
it, that he really learned what it 
meant to be immersed in more 
work than he could possibly handle. 
It is apparent that the long hours 
and concentrated effort paid off for 
him because, while he was an asso-
ciate when he began with the firm in 
193-t, he had become a junior partner 
by 1939, and a general partner by 
1942. 
During his tenure with the Dorsey 
firm, Judge Blackmun received an 
extensive education in taxation and 
probate work, two fields which con-
tinue to hold his interest, the for-
mer of which even now accounts for 
a large portion of the cases coming 
before the Federal Circuit Court. 
If he is asked about trial work, 
Judge Blackmun will reply that he 
wishes he had had more and that 
"practice in the courtroom is inval-
uable to the young practitioner, 
~I Dicta by the Dean 
The raising of ad.mission requirements iL announced la.st sp1·irig has 
been recognized b many people cl'.lllcerned \\·ith legal education ll..s one. of 
the.mo t ignificant developments at Willi&m. I fitchell. I haYe heard many 
comment' to thl effect from law school deans and faculty men.. The step-
up from minimum ta.ndard to the .requirement of a. substantial admission 
index arrived at by totalling points earned by the pre-law college average 
and by the Law School Admission Test score places our school in the com-
pany of all other good law schools. 
The number of applications for admission has remained almost con-
tan_t during the last three years. The increased number of a.p:plican who 
i'ailec..l to meet requirement Wlder the nc,1· tandard and the resulting 
reduced enrollment fo-c the fust year class were e.'\'.p cted . Bv virtue of au 
increase in tuitiotL effective Lhis emeste.r it has been possible to contnme 
the improvement of th over.all educational program in spite of the lower 
enrollm.ent. Mr. John G. Hervey, the American Bar Association' Adviser 
to the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, told our 
Board of Trustees in October that the raising of admission standards will 
result in a tedu,ced enrollment lor the fust two or three year~, but that 
thereafter enrollment will be greater than before the change in stauda.rcls, 
because high standards attract more good students. My owu experience 
confirms this. 
The average Law School cl.mission Te. t !!"Core oi all students accepted 
for this :rear' entering cl.as inc.rea ·ed somewhat from last year's average. 
This indicat an improved aptitude for law study that shouJa mean 
fewer failures in the future in law school and in bar examinations. 
* * * 
Speaking of bar examinations, 83 per cent of our students passed the 
July '63 Minnesota examination. 
* * * 
Mr. Hervey made his periodic inspection of William Mitchell on Oc-
tober 17 and 18. At a dinner meeting of our Board of Trustees he com-
plimented the board on the success of the merger of the Minneapolis-
Minnesota College of Law and the St. Paul College of Law, and on the 
progress since the merger. 
You will find in this issue of the Opinion a report of the luncheon ar-
ranged in Mr. Hervey's honor. This luncheon proved to be a most gratify-
ing experience for the 52 men present. It was our first opportunity to 
bring together the members of our Board of Trustees, our Faculty, the 
Committee and Staff on Professional Responsibility, the Staff on Moot 
Court, and some of our friends from the West Publishing Company. It 
was an impressive gathering. 
* * * 
The Institute on Water Law provided our school with a useful and 
happy contact with a number of men from other professions as well as 
our own. One-third of the attendance of 70 to 80 was made up of engi-
neers and scientists. At the last of the six weekly sessions we were asked 
to consider the desirability of another institute on the same subject after 
two or three years. 
The lecturers and members of the planning committee devoted many 
hours in a spirit of public service, in order to make this institute worth 
while for those who are coneetned about the growing impor a.nee of the 
manner in which our water resources are managed and used and the 
intricacies of the legal and pl1ysic!!.l problem s involved. William Mitchell 
and the legal profession generally are greatly indebted to these men. 
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Federal Tax Liens - History and Application 
by Walter Anastas 
From the very beginnings of or-
ganized forms of government the 
power of taxation has been regarded 
as a necessary and indispensable in-
cident of sovereignty. From an 
equally early time sovereigns have 
resorted to some r a t h e r drastic 
means of collection. The modern en-
lightened view is that taxes are the 
lifeblood of the government and their 
availability must be prompt and 
certain. To this end the assessment 
of a tax traditionally has had the 
force and effect of a judgment, and 
if the amount assessed is not paid 
when due, administrative officials 
may seize the debtor's property to 
satisfy the debt. This charge or en-
cumbrance upon a taxpayer's prop-
erty, securing the payment of a law-
fully imposed tax, and having the 
force of a judgment, is the essence 
of a tax lien. 
The United States, from an early 
point in its existence, has used the 
tax lien as an important feature of 
its system of tax collection. As early 
as 1797 Congress enacted a statute 
for the protection of the revenue of 
the United States1 which became 
the first step in a long line of enact-
ments leading to the present-day 
comprehensive scheme of liens se-
curing the payment of federal taxes. 
Today there are several kinds of 
federal tax liens; a lien for the tax 
on distilled spirits, a ten-year estate 
tax lien,2 a ten-year gift tax lien,3 
and a general tax lien securing all 
federal taxes which are assessed. It 
is this latter lien which is of the 
widest interest and to which at-
tention will be directed in this 
discussion. 
The general federal tax lien is im-
posed by section 6321 of the ln-
te~nal Revenue Code4 in these brief 
words: 
"If any person liable to pay 
any tax neglects or refuses to 
pay the same after demand, the 
amount (including any interest, 
additional amount, addition to 
tax, or assessable penalty, to-
gether with any costs that may 
accrue in addition thereto) shall 
be a lien in favor of the United 
States upon all property and 
rights to property, whether real 
or personal, belonging to such 
person." 
The next section, section 6322,5 
similarly brief, provides when the 
lien arises and the period of its 
effectiveness: 
"Unless another date is spe-
cifically fixed by law, the lien 
imposed by section 6321 shall 
arise at the time the assessment 
is made and shall continue until 
the liability for the amount so 
assessed is satisfied or becomes 
unenforceable by reason of lapse 
of time." 
These two sections have been in 
_ __.existence in substantially their pres-
ent form since 1879. Under the pres-
ent section 6322, the lien arises at 
the time the assessment is made. 
Prior to the effective date of the 
1954 Code, the lien arose, pursuant 
to section 3672 of the 1939 Code, at 
the time when the assessment list 
was received by the collector of in-
ternal revenue. Both are adminis-
trative acts performed by adminis-
trative officials without any public 
notice or court proceeding. 
A federal tax lien may be en-
forced by the Government in a num-
ber of ways, one of them being by 
levy.6 This procedure is simple and 
direct and is administrative in na-
ture, being effected without resort 
to court proceedings. It includes the 
power of distraint and seizure by 
any means and the sale of the prop-
erty or rights to property. When 
the taxpayer's property is in the 
hands of a third person, the levy is 
effected by the service of a levy 
• 
About the Author 
Thirty-three year old Walter 
Anastas is a fourth-year student at 
Anastas 
William Mitchell. 
A 1956 graduate of 
the College of Busi-
ness Administration 
at the University of 
Minnesota, Walter 
is currently a law 
clerk for the firm of 
Dorsey, Owen , 
Marquart, Wind-
horst & West in 
Minneapolis. Formerly, he was em-
ployed at Minnesota Mining & 
Manufacturing. Walter is married, 
has one child, and lives at 534 Pel-
ham Blvd. in St. Paul. 
• 
document on such third person.7 
With the above general character-
ization and statutory background of 
the federal tax lien in mind, the 
questiqn remains; how does it work 
in practice and what is its extent 
and impact upon property rights in 
the business world? 
Public Notice and Problems 
of Priority 
As was pointed out earlier, under 
the modern enlightened view of the 
nature of taxation and taxes few 
would deny the Government the 
same security for the obligations ow-
ing to it as the law grants an ordi-
nary creditor who takes the neces-
sary steps to secure a lien on his 
debtor 's property. There are numer-
ous types of security transactions 
which give rise to liens, occurring 
with great frequency in today's 
business world. On the other hand, 
the laws pertaining to liens, whether 
consensual or otherwise, insist on 
certain minimum formalities which 
a lienor must observe in order to 
perfect his claim and to secure for 
it priority over later interests or 
claims of others to the same prop-
erty. The most important of these 
formalities are the requirements of 
notice, either actual or constructive, 
to all interested parties of the exist-
ence of the lien; they are designed 
to protect innocent third parties 
from subsequently acquiring legiti-
mate claims to the same property in 
the belief that it is unencumbered. 
This is normally accomplished 
through a comprehensive system of 
recording or filing of lien claims in 
a public record. Closely interwoven 
with these requirements of record-
ing and notice are the methods of 
deciding conflicts between compet-
ing claims, based on the venerable 
principle of law that if a lien is 
prior in time, it is prior in right. 
Sound logic and a sense of fair play 
would dictate that federal tax liens 
be fitted into this over-all system 
for the determination of priority of 
competing claims. 
However, a federal tax lien comes 
into being when the assessment is 
noted on the "summary record," as 
it is called, of the District Director 
of Internal Revenue, which record 
is generally not available to the 
public. Thus the Government's tax 
lien has the character of a secret 
lien; it fails to warn the public 
against the risk of transactions 
which merely appear free and clear 
of any liens, and in which credit is 
extended.s This leads to the incon-
gruous situation of a taxpayer on 
whose business a federal tax lien 
has been placed, carrying on that 
business for the benefit of the Gov-
ernment at the expense of his un-
suspecting creditors. 
Apart from the secret nature of 
the federal tax lien at its inception, 
a requirement that it be recorded to 
give the public constructive notice 
of its existence would appear to 
remedy its most harmful effects. 
The statute makes no provision for 
recording; however the question was 
early tested in the courts. In United 
States v. Snyder9 real estate in 
Louisiana was sold after a tax was 
assessed against its owner. In an ac-
tion by the United States to fore-
close its tax lien, brought after the 
sale of the property, the purchaser 
contended that the federal tax lien 
was ineffective because it was no: 
recorded as required by the law of 
Louisiana. The single question pre-
sented to the Supreme Court was 
whether tax liens of the United 
States were subject to the recording 
laws of the states. The Court held 
that they were not, saying: 
" If the United States, pro-
ceeding in one of their own 
courts, in the collection of a tax 
admitted to be legitimate, can 
be thwarted by the plea of a 
state statute prescribing that 
such a tax must be assessed and 
recorded under state regulation 
... it would follow that the 
potential existence of the gov-
ernment of the United States is 
at the mercy of state legislation. 
". . . the tax system of the 
United States is regulated by 
the federal statutes and prac-
tice, and is not controlled by 
state enactments."10 
The next occasion upon which 
the Supreme Court considered this 
question was in Blacklock v. United 
States.11 There the real estate in 
question was conveyed by deed of 
trust to secure an indebtedness 
when there was an unrecorded fed-
eral tax lien in being. The Court 
reaffirmed the rule of the Snyder 
case and held that the lien was en-
forceable against a subsequent en-
cumbrancer without notice, that it 
was a statutory lien of the sover-
eign and therefore there was no ba-
sis for the application of the equi-
table doctrine of bona fide purchase. 
It concluded that the Government 
had the right by distraint to sell 
the interest of the delinquent tax-
payer, and that neither the taxpayer 
nor anyone asserting rights under 
the deed of trust had any right of 
action against the Government. 
To alleviate the harshness of this 
line of cases and to quiet the storm 
of protest which followed them, 
Congress in 1913 amended the stat-
ute by adding a new provision 
which left the two existing sections 
unchanged, but provided that the 
tax lien should not be valid against 
any mortgagee, purchaser or j udg-
ment creditor until notice thereof 
had been filed in a properly desig-
nated public office.12 In 1939 
pledgees were added to the classes 
which are protected by this sec-
tion,13 so that the lien was invalid 
against them unless notice thereof 
was filed. The net result of these 
two amendments is that once a fed-
eral tax lien has arisen it is fully 
perfected against all subsequent 
liens and interests, except those of 
mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, or 
judgment creditors of the taxpayer. 
To be fully perfected against these 
special classes, notice of the tax lien 
must be filed in the places desig-
nated by state law. But even with 
this sp"cial protection in the statute, 
the application of federal tax liens 
to the protected classes of claimants 
raises numerous vexatious problems, 
which will be discussed later. 
Is First in Time First in Right? 
It is important to note that the 
federal tax lien statute does not say 
the government lien is prior to 
other liens. It simply says that the 
Government shall have a lien on 
the property of the taxpayer.14 For 
many years lower federal courts fol-
lowed the common-law doctrine of 
"first in time, first in right" and 
state statutes defining a valid lien. 
They expressed the view that sec-
tion 6321 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, and its predecessors, 
did not confer upon a federal lien 
a priority in rank which, apart from 
the provisions of the statute, would 
not exist.15 However, in Spokane 
County v . United Statesl6 the Su-
preme Court for the first time 
launched the doctrine of the incho-
ate lien. In this case state law pro-
vided that a personal property tax 
was a lien on all the personal and 
real property of the taxpayer, if he 
no longer possessed the personal 
property on which the tax was as-
sessed, and prescribed a procedure 
for enforcing such lien. The Court 
held that the lien was inchoate un-
til this procedure had been fol-
lowed, and that the federal priority 
defeats an antedated lien that is 
not choate. The inchoate lien doc-
trine took on further strength in 
Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Camp-
bell.11 Here the state recorded its 
unemployment compensation lien 
which by statute became a first lien 
on the personal property of the em-
ployer. In order to protect its se-
curity, the state had a receiver 
appointed and had a court enjoin 
other creditors from interfering with 
the property. The Supreme Court 
held that this lien "was not suffi-
ciently specific or perfected" to 
interfere with a federal tax lien. 
The priority issue finally culmi-
nated in the 1950 case of United 
States v . Security Trust & Savings 
Bank.18 Real estate in California 
had been attached by a creditor 
of the taxpayer and judgment there-
after obtained and recorded. In the 
meantime, however, the United 
States had filed notices of federal 
tax lien upon assessments that were 
received after the attachment. Here, 
clearly, the federal tax lien arose 
after the attachment. State law pro-
vided that the lien of an attachment 
on real property attached and be-
came effective upon the recording of 
a copy of the writ, together with a 
description of the property attached. 
The Supreme Court held that the 
tax lien was superior to the "in-
choate" attachment lien, and re-
versed the judgment of the state 
court. In doing so, the Court drew 
a parallel between the general tax 
lien involved in the case at bar and 
the priority of claims of the United 
States against insolvent debtors un-
der Revised Statutes section 3466:19 
"In cases involving a kindred 
matter, i.e., the federal priority 
under Rev. Stat . sec. 3466, it 
has never been held sufficient to 
defeat the federal priority mere-
ly to show a lien effective to 
protect the lienor against others 
than the Government, but con-
tingent upon taking subsequent 
steps for enforcing it .. .. If the 
purpose of the federal tax lien 
statute to insure prompt and 
certain collection of taxes due 
the United States from tax de-
linquents is to be fulfilled, a sim-
ilar rule must prevail here . Ac-
cordingly, we hold that the tax 
liens of the United States are 
superior to the inchoate attach-
ment lien .... "20 
The basis for the Court's holding 
that the attachment lien was in-
choate was the provision of state 
law that the lien would terminate 
if three years elapsed without a 
judgment being rendered in the 
cause . It was immaterial that the 
lienor in fact recovered judgment 
within the three-year period, be-
cause the judgment came after the 
federal tax lien arose. In spite of the 
state rule that the rights of the 
judgment creditor related back to 
the date of the attachment lien, the 
Court said that, prior to judgment, 
the attachment lien was "contingent 
or inchoate - merely a notice that a 
right to perfect a lien exists"21 and 
that the state rule of "relation back" 
could not "operate to destroy the 
realities of the situation."22 
Several important rules emerge 
from the majority opinion in the 
Security Trust case. The most ob-
vious one is that an antecedent non-
federal lien on a taxpayer's prop-
erty must also be choate in order to 
prevail over a later federal tax lien. 
Choate means perfected, but it is 
not clear from this case at what 
stage a non-federal lien becomes 
sufficiently perfected to be competi-
tive with a federal tax lien. Con-
ceivably different types of liens may 
reach that stage of perfection at 
different points in their legal exist-
ence. One point, however, does ap-
pear clearly: In the case of an 
attachment lien this degree of per-
fection is not achieved until the 
attaching creditor's claim is reduced 
to judgment. From this it follows 
that a federal tax lien filed prior to 
such judgment, even though after 
the date of the attachment, will al-
ways take priority over the attach-
ment lien. Another point which 
clearly appears from the Security 
Trust case is that a non-federal lien 
which is not perfected at the time 
the government tax lien arises can 
not obtain priority over such tax 
lien on any theory of relation back 
established by state law. 
The majority opinion in the Se-
curity Trust case indicates that the 
Court adopted the "choate lien" 
doctrine as developed in insolvency 
cases decided under section 3466 of 
the Revised Statutes.23 Mr. Justice 
Jackson, in his separate concurring 
opinion in the case, went even fur-
ther. He would make no attempt to 
determine the choate or inchoate 
character of the competing non-
federal lien, or to determine priority 
by analogy to section 3466. Instead 
he would place sole reliance on sec-
tion 3672 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1939,24 extending special 
protection to mortgagees, pledgees, 
purchasers, and judgment creditors 
without notice of the federal lien. 
In this connection he said:-
"My conclusion ... is that 
the statute excludes from the 
provisions of this secret lien 
those types of interests which it 
specifically in cl u de d in the 
statute and no others."25 
He also concluded that an attach-
ing creditor, prior to judgment, is 
not a judgment creditor within the 
protection of the statute, because 
"only a judgment creditor in the 
conventional sense is protected."26 
This view, while not followed by a 
majority of the Court, is very sig-
nificant. If accepted, it would lead 
to a situation in which no compet-
ing non-federal lien would ever be-
come choate for federal tax purposes, 
unless it came within the four classes 
of interests protected by section 
6323 of the 1954 Code. As a practi-
cal result, no interests other than 
those expressly enumerated in that 
section, even though created before 
the tax lien arose, could ever prevail 
over a subsequent tax lien. 
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The importance of the Security 
Trust case and its far-reaching ca-
pacity for bringing about harsh and 
inequitable results should not be 
underestimated. Under it the federal 
tax lien takes on the character of a 
secured claim whereby the Govern-
ment has an interest in the taxpay-
er's property, thus securing to the 
Government a privileged position 
superior to that of the taxpayer's 
creditors whose liens, notwithstand-
ing, may have been prior in time. 
This at least partly abrogates the 
common-law rule that a lien which 
is prior in time is also prior in right, 
so far as federal tax lien priorities 
are concerned. One writer takes the 
position that the common-law rule 
is limited by the fact that tax liens 
are not ordinary liens - they are 
liens of a sovereignty and a sover-
eign can do no wrong.2 7 Not only 
does the sovereignty doctrine appear 
to be a limiting factor to the com-
mon-law doctrine, but also the 
federal courts' interpretation of state 
lien law and their invention of the 
terms " inchoate" and "unperfected." 
These factors have, since the Secur-
ity Trust case, defeated numerous 
liens that theretofore had been con-
sidered valid by reason of priority 
in time. 
Wh~n Does a Non-Federal Lien 
Be,~ome Choate: A Judicial 
Mirage 
Since the Security Trust case Su-
preme Court interpretations have 
almost consistently followed a 
course favoring the government lien, 
often at the expense of innocent 
third parties. This tendency bas 
been most evident in the area deal-
ing with the relative priority of an 
allegedly superior non-federal lien in 
competition with the federal tax 
lien . The federal tax lien has been 
preferred over rival liens in all but 
one of the past 13 cases decided by 
the Court. United States v. City of 
New Britain2 8 represents the sole 
exception to this otherwise perfect 
record. In none of the other cases 
was the rival lien sufficiently per-
fected to gain priority over the 
federal lien. It therefore becomes 
important to find out what steps 
have to be taken by a lienor to se-
cure for his lien the right to stand 
on an equal footing with the federal 
lien. 
The opinion in the Security Trust 
case, which was the first to apply 
the term "choate" to a tax priority 
issue in the case of a solvent tax-
payer, indicates that the Court 
adopted the choate lien doctrine as 
developed in cases dealing with in-
solvent debtors of the United States 
under section 3466 of the Revised 
Statutes . Although the Supreme 
Court has never found a "choate 
lien" in a section 3466 insolvency 
case, the decisions have crystallized 
four prerequisites to the existence of 
such a specific and perfected lien. 
These prerequisites require that the 
lien be definite as to the following 
aspects: 
1. the identity of the lienor;29 
2. the identity of the property 
subject to the lien;30 
3. the amount secured by the 
lien;31 
4. the fourth requirement relates 
to the perfection of a non-
possessory lien by divesting the 
debtor of title or possession to 
the property, severing it from 
his general assets.32 
The requirements of specificity 
and perfection which a lien must 
satisfy to become "choate," as de-
veloped in the insolvency cases, have 
been somewhat watered down when 
transferred to the tax lien cases. 
Thus the lienor need not divest the 
debtor-taxpayer of title or posses-
sion in the property subject to the 
lien. This was borne out in United 
States v. City of New Britain.33 In 
this case a city's tax liens were held 
to be choate from the date they 
attached to realty, even though the 
taxpayer had not been divested of 
title or possession before the fed-
eral tax lien arose. This case also 
presents the rare instance of specific 
and perfected non-federal liens. It is 
the only case so far in which at least 
some of the competing non-federal 
liens involved were regarded as 
meeting the Supreme Court's test 
of specificity and perfection. The 
liens involved were for delinquent 
real estate taxes and water rents 
and it should be observed that the 
property involved was the specific 
real estate to which such liens at-
tached. The Court said that the 
municipal liens were specific in that 
"they attached to specific pieces of 
real estate"S-l and that they were 
perfected "in the sense that there is 
nothing more to be done to have a 
choate lien - when the identity of 
the lienor, the property subject to 
the lien, and the amount of the lien 
are established."35 Thus the contest 
was between two groups of liens at-
tached to the same real estate, both 
statutory, but one specific and the 
other general, with no question of 
insolvency involved. Therefore, the 
Court said, the principle of "the 
first in time is the first in right" 
applied. 
In comparing this case with other 
cases involving tax lien priority, it 
may be of some importance to ob-
serve that the Court noted that 
these liens were on specific realty, 
while the United States was free to 
pursue the whole of the debtor's 
property wherever situated. Ob-
viously, real estate can not be re-
moved beyond the state's bounda-
ries, and real estate taxes are defi-
nitely fixed as to amount, the 
identity of the lienor is established, 
as is the property subject to the lien. 
No case prior to New Britain, nor 
any since then, has fared as well . 
In United States v. Gilbert Associ-
ates3G one of the rules enunciated 
in the Security Trust case was ap-
plied, namely, that "judgment credi-
tor" in section 3672 of the 1939 
Code37 is used in the usual, con-
ventional sense of a judgment of a 
court of record. In this case the lien 
of a town grew out of an ad valorem 
tax on certain machinery. In point 
of time, the local tax assessments 
were prior, and state law provided 
that such assessments were "in the 
nature of a judgment." On this 
basis, the town contended that it 
was a judgment creditor and there-
fore within the protection of the 
statute, since the notice of the fed-
eral tax lien was not filed until after 
the local tax lien arose. The Court 
rejected this contention, pointing 
out: 
. 'judgment creditor' should 
have the same application in all 
the states . In this instance, we 
think Congress used the words 
'judgment creditor' in section 
3672 in the usual, conventional 
sense of a judgment of a court 
of record, since all states have 
such courts."38 
Thus the Court excluded the town 
from the protected dass in the 
statute and gave priority to the 
federal lien. 
Three cases decided together in 
1955 involved the relative priority 
between state created liens and 
federal tax liens. In United States 
v. Acri39 an action was filed against 
Acri in an Ohio court and certain 
cash and bonds were attached. 
The United States asserted its claim 
for unpaid taxes against Acri some 
three months after the issuance of 
the attachment writ. More than a 
year later judgment was recovered 
against Acri in the original action. 
A conflict then arose between the 
attachment lien and the federal 
tax lien. The Ohio courts had held 
an attachment to be an execution 
in advance and a lien perfected as 
at the time of attachment. The Su-
preme Court held that the Ohio at-
tachment lien was, at the time of 
its issuance, inchoate for federal 
tax purposes, because at that point 
the fact and the amount of the lien 
were contingent upon the outcome 
of the suit for damages. Mr. Justice 
Minton, speaking for a unanimous 
Court, upheld the priority of the 
federal tax lien, declaring that the 
case was controlled by the Security 
Trust case which had raised the 
identical issue. The opinion went on 
to say that the relative priority of 
a lien of the United States for un-
paid taxes is a federal question. It 
was therefore immaterial that un-
der state law the judgment lien on 
Acri's property was considered per-
fected as of the time of attachment. 
The determination of when a lien is 
choate for federal tax purposes is 
likewise a federal question, to be 
determined by federal courts. A 
state characterization of a competing 
lien as "perfected" or "choate," 
while good for all state purposes, 
does not bind the federal courts.40 
The second ca5e decided with Acri 
was United States v . Liverpool & 
London & Globe Ins . Co.41 This case 
involved a lien of garnishment. The 
subject of the litigation was a fund 
due under a fire insurance policy . 
A garnishment was served on the 
insurance company in connection 
with a suit on an open account. 
After judgment against the debtor-
taxpayer, but before the court issued 
a pay-in order for the garnishing 
creditor, the federal tax lien arose. 
The Court, citing the Acri case and 
the Security Trust case, held the 
federal tax lien prior to that of the 
garnishing creditor. The theory be-
hind this holding was that the 
garnishment lien was inchoate at the 
time the federal lien arose, in that 
the precise amount of the garnish-
ment lien was dependent on the 
outcome of the principal suit. 
The third case decided in this 
group, United States v. Scovil,42 in-
volved the relative priority of a 
landlord's distress for rent under 
the laws of South Carolina and a 
federal tax lien. Again the non-
federal lien was held inchoate and 
the tax lien given priority. This case 
is primarily significant for dicta it 
contains, which appear to accept 
Mr. Justice Jackson's theory stated 
in his concurring opinion in the 
Security Trust case . Here the Court 
said: "The landlord had a lien other 
than a mortgage, pledge, or jurlg-
ment lien. As to all other liens . . . 
(section) 3672 .. . afforded no pro-
tection. United States v. Security 
Trust Co. ( concurring opin-
ion) ."43 
The inequities flowing from the 
Court's decisions may be most clear-
ly seen in the cases dealing with 
m echanics' liens. The artisan, having 
enhanced the value of another's 
property, is given a statutory lien 011 
that property to protect his invest-
ment. Nevertheless, a federal tax 
lien assessed on that property at any 
time before the mechanic's lien is 
reduced to judgment prevails over 
the mechanic's lien . The Govern-
ment, in seizing and disposing of the 
taxpayer's property to satisfy the 
tax delinquency, is therefore seizing 
property created by the as yet un-
compensa ted investment of the 
mechanic lienor. In effect, the artisan 
has been forced to pay another 
party's taxes, and the tax lien has 
reached more property than the 
taxpayer actually owns. 
Mechanic lienors suffered three 
successive setbacks in the Supreme 
Court, all by terse per curiam orders 
without opinions. In United States 
v. ColottaH the federal lien arose 
after the work was completed, but 
prior to the recording of the me-
chanic's lien. The Court held the 
mechanic's lien inchoate and gave 
priority to the federal tax lien. 
In United States v. White Bear 
Brewing Ca.45 the federal tax lien 
arose after the mechanic's lien had 
come into existence, after it had 
been recorded according to state law, 
and after a suit to enforce it had 
been instituted in a state equity 
court. The Court succinctly held the 
mechanic's lien inchoate and sub-
ordinated it to the tax lien. 
In United States v. Vorreiter4G 
there was involved priority between 
a mechanic's lien valid under state 
law and a subsequently arising fed-
eral tax lien, again with the same 
result. 
pursuer again. With the exception 
of the New Britain case, no lawyer 
can say that he has seen a genuine 
choate non-federal lien, at least not 
in the halls of the United States 
Supreme Court. As a practical result, 
no interests other than those ex-
pressly enumerated in section 6323 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 
J 954, even though created before 
the federal lien arises, can prevail 
over a subsequent tax lien. Con-
versely, only those four classes of 
interests found in that section, if 
they arose before the federal tax 
lien was recorded, have any chance 
of prevailing over the federal tax 
lien.49 
The rationale behind these deci- Property to Which Federal Lien 
sions is that a mechanic's lien is not Attaches_ A New Approach 
a property right, but only a notice 
of intent to assert a property right, 
and that the amount of such a lien 
is not determined and certain until 
reduced to judgment. 
The White Bear Brewing case 
involved another principle of im-
portance, namely, the effect of a 
federal lien which arises after a 
court of equity has acquired juris-
diction of the property in a foreclo-
sure proceeding. The doctrine of lis 
pendens, a basic and cardinal prin-
ciple of law, states that if an inter-
est is acquired in property during 
the pendency of such a suit, that in-
terest is bound by the decree of the 
court. Does this case indicate that 
the Government is not bound by the 
rule of lis pendens? Can the Govern-
ment sit by in a foreclosure action, 
let the property go to decree of fore-
closure and sale, and then step in 
and take it over for its lien? This is-
sue was argued in the White Bear 
Brewing case, but the court made 
no mention of it in its per curiam 
decision of the case. If lis pendens 
does not apply, lawyers may have 
to make the United States a party 
defendant in every mortgage or me-
chanic's lien foreclosure action, on 
the ground that it has a secret lien 
for unpaid taxes on the property in-
volved, in order to conclude any in-
terest the Government may later 
assert .47 
It was the expectation that con-
tractual or consensual liens might 
have a better standing than stat-
utory liens. United States v. R. F . 
Ball Construction Co.48 indicates 
that such expectation ·was un-
founded . This case involved a con-
test between a federal tax lien and 
the claim of a surety on a surety 
bond of the contractor-taxpayer. 
The specific question presented was 
whether an assignment by a con-
tractor to his performance bond 
surety of all sums due or to become 
due under his contract, as security 
for any indebtedness or liability 
thereafter incurred by the contrac-
tor to the surety, constituted the 
surety a "mortgagee" of those sums 
within the meaning of section 6323 
of the 1954 Code. After the per-
formance bond was executed and 
the bonding company obtained an 
assignment of the contract proceeds 
as security, a federal tax lien against 
the contractor was recorded. There-
after the contractor defaulted on his 
contract and the bonding company 
finished the job with its funds, thus 
becoming entitled to the contract 
proceeds. The Government con-
tested the surety's right to the pro-
ceeds. The Court, in a short per 
curiam opinion, announced that the 
instrument involved, being inchoate 
and unperfected, did not bring into 
play the provisions of section 6323, 
and held the government lien prior. 
The Ball Construction case stands 
as a warning to those who take a 
security for a future or contingent 
obligation, the theory being that if 
the obligation is contingent and has 
no fixed legal existence, there can be 
no security for it and the lien is 
therefore unperfected and inchoate. 
From the cases reviewed above 
the concept of a choate non-federal 
lien emerges as a mirage in the des-
ert of federal priority - just when 
it seems within grasp it eludes its 
As has been said, section 6321 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
imposes the federal tax lien upon 
"all property and rights to prop-
erty, whether real or personal" of 
a delinquent taxpayer. The statute 
does not say what is "property," or 
which law, state or federal, inter-
prets that term. However judicial 
interpretation has clarified the con-
cept somewhat. The sweep of the 
tax lien has been held to embrace 
all kinds of property including tan-
gible property and equitable inter-
ests, in fact anything that is: 1) sub-
ject to ownersr1ip; ~) capable of 
being tra.llsferred· S) capable of be-
ing brought under the jurisdiction 
of a court by any of its us.uaJ proc-
esses. T hi· obvioW!ly include debts 
owing to the taxpayer.50 The tax 
lien automatically attaches not only 
to all such property owned by the 
taxpayer when the lien arises, but 
also to any after-acquired prop-
erty.GI In short, the federal lien has 
a built-in after-acquired property 
clause. 
Through this imposing network 
of rules a very important principle 
stands out clearly: there must be 
some property, interest, or right of 
the taxpayer for the tax lien to at-
tach to. Once this principle is rec-
ognized, two important questions 
immediately arise: What property 
or rights belong to the taxpayer at 
the moment the tax lien comes into 
existence? And by what law is 
the determination of this question 
governed? 
In United States v. Bess52 the 
Supreme Court said that the tax 
lien statute creates no property 
rights but merely attaches conse-
quences, federally defined, to rights 
created under state law, and that 
therefore in the application' of that 
statute, state law controls in deter-
mining nature and extent of inter-
est the taxpayer had in the prop-
erty sought to be reached. The re-
(Continued on Page 5) 
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suit of this case is that while the 
issue of priority of a federal tax 
lien is a federal question, what.prop-
erty or right belongs to the tax-
payer is governed by state law. 
Out of this rule arises a modest 
body of cases which holds out some 
chance of success to the holder of 
a non-federal lien which must com-
pete with a federal tax lien for the 
same property. The leader in this 
line of cases, and the only one so 
far tested in the Supreme Court is 
Aquilino v. United States.53 In this 
case a contractor owed the United 
States certain unpaid taxes. He con-
tracted to remodel a building, sub-
contracting part of the work to 
the plaintiff. Notice of a federal 
tax lien was then filed by the United 
States, and subsequently plaintiff-
subcontractor, being unpaid, claimed 
a right to the contract proceeds due 
the contractor from the owner of 
the building. Having filed appropri-
ate lien notices, the subcontractor 
proceeded to foreclose his lien 
against the property. The owner of 
the building then deposited the sum 
due the defaulting contractor in 
court, and the United States was 
substituted as defendant. It asserted 
a prior right to the contract pro-
ceeds by virtue of having previously 
perfected a tax lien against the gen-
eral contractor. New York state 
courts upheld the priority of the 
federal lien, and the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed.04 On certiorari, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case, 
directing the Court of Appeals to 
"ascertain the property interest of 
the taxpayer under state law and 
then dispose of the case according 
to the established rules of prior-
ity. " 55 On remand the Court of Ap-
peals held that the general contrac-
tor, having defaulted on his con-
tract, had no property interest in 
any money due, but was merely a 
trustee for the benefit of unpaid 
subcontractors. Thus he had no 
property in the fund to which the 
federal lien could attach, and the 
lien was ineffective.56 
The Aquilino case provided a 
very small breach in the forbidding 
wall of federal lien superiority. If 
it could be shown that the delin-
quent taxpayer had acquired no 
property in a particular fund, com-
peting non-federal claimants could 
reach such fund, notwithstanding 
a perfected federal tax lien against 
the taxpayer. Such showing pre-
sented no easy task, but this was 
just the opening needed by a num-
ber of bonding companies attempt-
ing to reimburse their losses under 
performance bonds of defaulting 
contractors out of contract proceeds 
retained by property owners or 
their escr.ow agents. Bonding com-
panies specializing in the issuing of 
contractors' bonds had been victims 
of a particularly vicious effect of 
federal tax liens. A contractor who 
defaulted on his contract was very 
likely also delinquent in his taxes, 
and thus a likely target for federal 
liens. When his surety, having had 
to pay for the completion of the 
contract, turned to the only source 
available for reimbursement- the 
retained contract proceeds - it im-
mediately ran into a priority con-
flict with the tax liens filed against 
the contractor. Its lien being clearly 
inchoate, the surety usually lost un-
der the priority rules developed by 
federal courts in cases discussed 
earlier. 
Thus most of the cases brought 
under the "no debt" theory spelled 
out in Aquilino involve sureties on 
bonds of defaulting contractors.57 
In a majority of them the surety 
was successful at the District Court 
level; only a few have reached the 
Circuit Courts of Appeal. 
Even with the "no debt" theory 
as a basis, these cases involve some 
fine distinctions in the choice of 
theories on which they proceed. It 
was held that a surety can not pre-
vail over a federal lien as a holder 
of an equitable lien related back to 
the bond application.58 The relation-
back theory would run afoul of the 
Security Trust and Acri cases. It 
was also said that a surety can not 
prevail as assignee of the contractor, 
because a lien growing out of an as-
signment would be inchoate, and 
therefore not on the same footing 
as the federal tax lien.59 The Ball 
Construction case is cited for this 
proposition. It is not clear if this 
represents a classification of such a 
lien based on assignment as consti-
tuting the surety a "purchaser" 
within the meaning of section 6323 
of the 1954 Code, whose interest 
would be protected only if his lien 
is choate. 
The most recent case to come to 
the writer's attention is Fidelity & 
Casualty Co. v. Dykstra & Roelofs 
Construction Co.,60 decided Septem-
ber 21, 1962 by the United States 
District Court for the District of 
Minnesota. The question for the 
court's decision in this case was 
whether a federal tax lien upon 
money allegedly due a contractor 
from the state under a highway con-
struction contract takes priority 
over a claim of the contractor's 
surety which, upon the contractor's 
default in the performance of the 
contract, completed it and paid all 
the necessary labor and material 
charges. 
Plaintiff surety company had is-
sued a bond on behalf of defendant 
Dykstra & Roelofs Construction Co. 
to secure its performance of a con-
tract with the State of Minnesota 
for construction of a stretch of high-
way. When Dykstra & Roelofs Con-
struction Co. defaulted and was un-
able to pay labor and material 
charges, plaintiff surety company 
paid these and other charges neces-
sary to complete the contract under 
the provisions of its bond. There 
was no assignment from the con-
tractor to the surety, but the surety 
subsequently brought an action to 
recover from the contractor the 
money it had paid out to complete 
performance of the contract, and ob-
tained a judgment by default. In 
the meantime, however, some three 
months before full performance of 
the contract by the surety, the 
United States filed notices of a tax 
lien against the contractor for un-
paid taxes. Pursuant thereto, upon 
completion of the contract, agents 
of the Internal Revenue Service 
seized the warrant issued by the 
State of Minnesota payable to Dyk-
stra & Roelofs Construction Co. 
for the amount remaining due under 
the contract. Plaintiff surety com-
pany, being unable to obtain satis-
faction of its judgment from the 
contractor, attempted to garnish in 
the hands of the State the sums re-
maining due for performance of the 
contract, thereby learning for the 
first time of the income tax lien as-
serted by the United States. Surety 
then brought the instant action, 
joining as defendants the contractor, 
the State of Minnesota, and the 
United States. It contended that, as 
completing surety, it was entitled to 
the sums due under the contract, 
on the theory of subrogation to the 
rights of the contractor's creditors. 
The Government, while conceding 
that the surety had a right of subro-
gation, claimed priority for its tax 
lien. The court, in an opinion by 
Chief Judge E. J. Devitt, held that 
plaintiff surety, and not the United 
States, was entitled to the fund in 
dispute. 
The court followed the rationale 
of the "no debt" doctrine cases, cit-
ing Aquilino v. United States61 and 
a number of other cases following 
that doctrine as basis for its conclu-
sion that the sole question in the 
instant case was whether contractor-
taxpayer had property or rights to 
property in the funds withheld by 
the State, to which the tax lien 
could attach, and that this question 
was governed by Minnesota law.62 
In arriving at this conclusion the 
court drew two significant distinc-
tions. It first repeated the distinc-
tion adopted in United States ex rel. 
Home lndem. Co. v. American Em-
ployers' Ins. Co.63 between the 
rights of a surety arising, as in this 
case, by subrogation, and those 
growing out of an assignment by 
the principal, stating that, in the 
case of a surety's lien growing out 
of an assignment, the lien in incho-
ate, and therefore would not be on 
the same footing with a federal tax 
lien. In this case, however, the ac-
tion was based on the theory 
that plaintiff was a completing 
surety; that is, upon the theory of 
subrogation. 
The other distinction made by the 
court was that the surety in paying 
the charges due to the laborers and 
materialmen, upon the contractor's 
default, became subrogated to the 
rights of these creditors, not of the 
contractor. The case must proceed 
upon this theory, because the con-
tractor lost all his rights by .his de-
fault, leaving nothing owing to him 
for the surety to be subrogated to. 
Proceeding to apply Minnesota 
law to the instant case, the court 
held that the contract involved was 
breached by the contractor and this 
breach excused the State of Minne-
sota from its obligation to make 
payment to the contractor. There 
being no debt owing from the State 
to the contractor, it follows that 
there was no property to which the 
lien of the United States could at-
tach. Judgment was therefore en-
tered for the surety. 
The instant case goes a long way 
towards clarifying the principles 
upon which a successful contest of 
a federal tax lien on the "no debt" 
theory must proceed. The decision 
has, as of this writing, not been re-
viewed by appeal. 
Conclusions and Some 
Unanswered Questions 
From the foregoing discussion it 
can be concluded that a federal tax 
lien can be defeated only in one of 
three ways: 
(1) Competing lienors or other 
claimants may claim a prior 
specific and perfected lien en-
titled to precedence under the 
common-law rule that "the 
first in time is the first in 
right"; or 
(2) as long as the federal lien is 
unfiled, they may seek to 
bring themselves within the 
classes of creditors - mortga-
gee, pledgee, purchaser, or 
judgment creditor of the tax-
payer - which are specifically 
protected by the statute; or 
(3) they may establish that the 
property on which the Gov-
ernment seeks to fasten its 
tax lien is not the property 
of the taxpayer at all. 
Only the last two approaches hold 
out any reasonable hope of success. 
Furthermore, the fact that the 
owner of a competing interest is a 
mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or 
judgment creditor within the mean-
ing of the statute does not; of itself, 
make his interest prior to the fed-
eral tax lien, unless that interest is 
choate. In other words, not only 
must the competing lien be first in 
point of time, but it must also be 
choate. When a lien becomes choate 
is a question for the federal courts 
to decide in each case, and in de-
termining this they have generally 
required that the non-federal lien 
be definite as to: (1) the identity of 
the lienor; (2) the amount of the 
lien; and (3) the property to which 
it attaches. 
When state courts have held a 
particular type of non-federal lien 
or interest to be inchoate or not per-
fected, the fed er al courts have 
treated such determination as con-
clusive, and have established prior-
ity of the federal lien in such cases. 
When, however, state courts have 
held a lien to be choate and per-
fected, the federal courts have ap-
plied the above three tests. When 
by the application of these tests the 
competing lien is found not to be 
perfected, the federal lien is given 
priority, even though it arose at a 
later point in time. Thus, if one con-
siders the filing of a federal tax lien 
as rendering it choate, the common-
law rule appears to be modified in 
cases of federal tax liens to mean 
"the first choate lien in time is the 
first in right." 
Many aspects and ramifications 
of federal tax liens remain unex-
pla.ined by the court decisions. Per-
haps the prime example is the ques-
tion of application of the doctrine 
of lis pendens. If, as is implied, a 
federal lien which arises during the 
pendency of an action to foreclose 
a non-federal lien, or to quiet title 
to realty, is not subject to the rule 
of lis pendens, and therefore can take 
priority over the title adjudicated 
in that action, the stability of real 
estate titles would be jeopardized. 
The effect of the present uncertainty 
on this point alone can be unsettling 
to real estate titles. To be safe must 
the Government be made a party 
defendant in every action to ad-
judicate a real estate title? 
Lawyers dealing with debtor-
creditor relations are confronted 
with other questions. Can a debtor 
pay his debt to a taxpayer-creditor 
without searching for secret tax 
liens? If a debtor owes a creditor-
taxpayer $1,000, and a secret fed-
eral tax lien exists, what will be the 
effect of the creditor settling with 
the debtor for $500? Will the Gov-
ernment have any rights against the 
debtor for the balance? 
If the Government levies on a 
taxpayer's bank account, and the 
bank pays over the amount on hand 
to the Government, must the bank 
now check the Government records 
every day for possible new tax liens, 
before paying out the taxpayer's 
subsequent deposits? 
These and other similar questions 
must await judicial interpretation in 
future cases . 
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Current Issues Discussed 
In Prof. Green's Quarterly 
by Gary Phleger 
Professor William A. Green of 
William Mitchell College of Law has 
seen three issues of his new quarter-
ly publication, Minnesota Continu-
ing Legal Education, become a re-
ality. After the first issue was re-
leased last spring as announced in 
the previous issue of this paper, 
there have been two subsequent 
issues released, in August and No-
vember of this year. This was ac-
cording to plan, for this quarterly 
publication is designed to aid Min-
nesota lawyers in improving their 
professional skills. 
It is interesting to note that simi-
lar publications are circulated in the 
states of New York, Wisconsin, and 
Danforth, Green 
Act as Reporters 
at Conference 
William Danforth, assistant dean 
and professor, and William Green, 
professor, served as reporters at the 
second annual meeting of the Min-
nesota District Judges Conference 
held November 7th and 8th. 
As reporters for two of the four 
discussion panels, they submitted 
oral and written reports summariz-
ing the topics discussed by each of 
the panels to the full conference and 
the Minnesota District Judges As-
sociation. 
Mr. Danforth also participated as 
a reporter at the first of these semi-
nars, which are now planned as 
annual conferences. This year's 
meeting lasted two days and took 
place at the Leamington Hotel in 
Minneapolis. 
Iliinois and are published by Callag-
han and Company which also pub-
lishes Mr. Green's work. 
Complimentary copies of the first 
two issues of Minnesota Continuing 
Legal Education were sent to most 
Minnesota lawyers and judges. Mr. 
Green indicated that while there 
have been some critical comments 
from readers, he feels the journal 
has been generally well accepted. 
The November issue contains an 
article by Raymond A. Haik, of the 
Minneapolis law firm of Erickson, 
Popham, Haik and Schnobrich, dis-
cussing the growing importance of 
water law. It is an expansion of the 
second lecture from the recent Wa-
ter Law Institute and is entitled 
"Theories of Water Law." The 
article also deals with the role of the 
federal government in the water re-
sources field. 
"Post Conviction Remedies in 
Minnesota" is written by Llewellyn 
H. Linde, counsel for the Correc-
tional Service of Minnesota, recent 
William Mitchell graduate, and 
member of the civil rights and other 
committees of the Minnesota State 
Bar Association. 
Mr. Green authors an article en-
titled "Minnesota Estate Planning 
-1963" which is a review of the 
current legislation by this state m 
the probate and trust fields. 
Among the other interesting ar-
ticles in the most recent issues are 
"Unauthorized .Practice of Law by 
Realtors and Title Insurance Com-
panies,." "Legal Responsibilities of 
the Person Preparing Tax Returns," 
and an article on management's 
rights in labor relations cases. 
If the publications to this point 
are indicative of the future, one can 
look forward to continued interest-
ing and informative articles from 
this quarterly work. 
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Introducing Our Alumni on the Way Up 
by R. W. Rahn 
Note: Many of your form er class-
mates would enjoy seeing recent 
pictures of you . Unfortunately, we 
do not have up-to-date shots of 
many alumni in our files, and in-
stead of using outdated pictures, 
we ask that you enclose a small 
glossy print of yourself when send-
ing material for this column. We 
will print as many as space will 
permit. However, please do not let 
lack of a photo discourage you from 
letting us know where you are and 
what you are doing, as that is the 
primary objective of this column. 
Our information on 1963 gradu-
ates is still rather sketchy, as many 
of them are involved in making 
changes, but have not yet reported 
to us. Won't you please keep in 
touch with your classmates through 
this column? 
1963 
Wayne A. V ander V ort has been 
promoted to the estate planning 
division at the First National Bank 
of Minneapolis. He· was formerly in 
the trust administration division. 
VanderVort was editor of the Opin-
ion while at William Mitchell. 
William Mortensen is now em-
ployed with Robins, Davis & Lyons, 
Minneapolis. 
Paul Magnuson is with LeVander, 
GilJen & Miller, South St. Paul. 
Wayne Dordell, top man in his 
class, and Gene Bradt, number two 
man in the same class, are now 
with Hansen, Hazen & Lynch, St. 
Paul. Bradt was formerly with 
Rider, Bennet & Egan, and Dordell 
was with the Erickson firm in Min-
neapolis, after serving as a clerk 
of court. 
Carl A. Johnson, Jr., has joined 
his father and brother as a partner 
in the firm of Johnson, Johnson & 
Johnson, Mankato, Minnesota. 
Tom O'Connor is to be with 
Berens & Rodenberg in New Ulm, 
Minnesota, as of February 3, 1964. 
Donald H assenstab is practicing 
with D . 0. Comer at Hutchin-
son, Minnesota. 
Raphael Miller and William P. 
Scott are now practicing as Scott 
& Miller at Gaylord, Minnesota. 
Scott was formerly public examiner 
for the State of Minnesota, and 
Miller was in the same office. 
Russell Streefiand is practicing 
at Burnsville, Minnesota. 
Jim Walsh, formerly with the 
Internal Revenue Service, is now 
with the CPA firm of Broker & 
Henderson, St. Paul. 
Jim Nelson is with Shermer & 
Gensler, Minneapolis. 
Floyd B. Olson is with the title 
insurance firm of Helgesen, Kane, 
Peterson & Engberg, Minneapolis. 
Kevin P. Howe has been trans-
ferred to the legal department at 
Investors Diversified Services. 
Tom McCoy has been transferred 
to the legal division at Minnesota 
Mutual Life Insurance Company, 
St. Paul. 
Mark Flahavan is now working in 
the office of the Minnesota Attor-
ney General. 
Dennis Challeen is now associated 
with Plunkett & Peterson, assisting 
Mr. Peterson in the Winona office 
of the firm, which also has an office 
in Rochester. 
Jim Guldan is now with Albert-
sen, Narton & Jergens, Stillwater, 
Minnesota. 
Dick Heineman is taking the 
Montana Bar Examination. 
Lloyd Larsen is taking the Cali-
fornia Bar Examination. 
James Mason is special assistant 
attorney general with the Railroad 
and Warehouse Commission, St. 
Paul. 
Jim Knutson has joined the firm 
of Peterson & Popovich, St. Paul. 
1962 
Edward M. Reichert, Jr ., is now 
practicing with Thomas J . Murphy 
in St. Cloud, Minn. 
Thomas W. Gruesen resigned De-
cember l , 1963, from the position of 
assistant city attorney, Duluth, to 
become an associate with James J. 
Courtney & Sons. He had previously 
been with the North Central Com-
pany, St. Paul. 
Dennis W. Strid is now with 
Robins, Davis & Lyons, Minne-
apolis. He was formerly law clerk 
for Hon. William P. Murphy, as-
sociate justice of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court. (Justice Murphy 
is also an alumnus, class of 1922). 
1961 
Howard E. Stenzel was appointed 
assistant legal counsel for Twin 
Cities Operations of Univac Divi-
sion, Sperry Rand Corporation, Oc-
tober 7, 1963. An employee of Uni-
vac in St. Paul for six years, he 
was formerly a contract administra-
tor for Navy programs. He holds a 
Bachelor's degree in accounting and 
economics from Mankato State Col-
lege, and was an instructor in ad-
vanced accounting and economics at 
Mankato Commercial College before 
joining Univac. A native of Elmore, 
Minnesota, Stenzel was elected to 
the College Court of Honor and 
served as vice president of the Stu-
dent Bar Association at William 
Mitchell. He resides with his family 
in St. Paul Park. 
Clarence Schlehuber spoke on 
wills and descent of property at the 
October 8th meeting of the Prog-
ress Club in Pine Island, Minnesota. 
John V. Jergens, of Forest Lake, 
Minnesota, was recently elected 
president of the Forest Lake De-
velopment Corporation board of 
directors. 
James M. Goetteman is with 
Stearns, Kampmeyer & Efron, St. 
Paul. 
Thomas M. Murphy is now in 
partnership with Arnold E . Kempe 
in West St. Paul. Both were for-
merly associated with Schultz & 
Springer, until that firm was dis-
solved due to the death of Mr. 
Springer and the elevation of Mr. 
Schultz to the Ramsey County Dis-
trict Bench. They are continuing the 
practice of the former partnership. 
1960 
Llewellyn H. Linde, legal counsel 
and social worker for Correctional 
Service of Minnesota, recently be-
gan writing a weekly series of legal 
articles in the Prison Mirror for 
inmates at the Minnesota State 
Prison at Stillwater. Born in 1928, 
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and raised at Cyrus, l\finnesota, 
Linde spent three years in the Air 
Force, then received a Bachelor's 
degree at Concordia College, Moor-
head, Minnesota, next a Master's 
in Social Science at Indiana, and 
finally his LL .B. at William 
Mitchell. H e and his wife, Marcella, 
have three children. 
Stanley N. Thorup is currently 
interviewing men at the Minnesota 
State Penitentiary who are peti-
tioning for writs to be reviewed by 
the Supreme Court. 
Richard T . Todd is now associ-
ated with Nehls, Anderson, LeVan-
der, Zimpfer & Monson in the gen-
eral practice of law in the Midland 
Bank Building, Minneapolis. 
Kenneth M . Schadeck is with 
Altman, Geraghty & Mulally, St. 
Paul. 
1958 
Le Roy F. W erges was promoted 
from legal assistant, installment 
1 o an department, to assistant 
cashier at Northwestern National 
Bank, Minneapolis. His election to 
that office was announced by the 
Board of Directors on November 
21. 
Lloyd J. Moosbrugger, who has 
been engaged in the practice of law 
at Ortonville, Minnesota, with 
Benson & Schreiner since 1958, has 
been named Special Assistant At-
torney General by Attorney Gen-
eral Walter F . Mondale, effective 
October 15th. 
1957 
Al Quello is now associated with 
Haugen & Quello in the practice of 
law in Wayzata, Minnesota. 
George Roth is now a partner in 
the firm of Carroll, Cronan, Roth & 
Austin, with offices in the Minne-
sota Federal Building, Minneapolis. 
1955 
Henry W. McCarr, Jr. , has been 
appointed Assistant Hennepin 
County Attorney, assigned to the 
Domestic Department. He was for-
merly with Ward & Johnson. 
1951 
Tom Myers is the new chairman 
of the National Conference of Bar 
Secretaries, and current executive 
secretary of the Minnesota State 
Bar Association. 
1941 
Edward G. Hitchcock has re-
signed from the Veteran's Admin-
istration to enter practice in St . 
Paul with Marie Swenson Hitch-
cock, as Hitchcock & Hitchcock. 
1935 
Philip D. Whitman, former As-
sistant Vice President at North-
western National Bank, Minneapo-
lis, was elected to the position of 
Vice President. His promotion was 
announced November 21 by the 
Board of Directors. In his new 
capacity, Whitman will be re-
sponsible for financing contractors 
in the heavy equipment field. 
1932 
Joseph M. Donahue, 56 , died in 
St. Paul November 10, 1963. A St. 
Paul lawyer, admitted to the bar 
in 1933, he had been president of 
the l\'Iinnesota State Bar Associa-
tion in 1960-61, Minnesota assist-
ant attorney general in the 1930's, 
attorney for the Minnesota State 
Dental Board of Examiners from 
1934 on, and attorney for the Min-
nesota State Dental Association 
since 1950. He was also 1956-57 
president of the Ramsey County 
Bar Association, St. Thomas More 
Lawyers Guild, Our Lady of Peace 
High School Parents Association, 
former chairman of the Family 
Rosary Procession, and was named 
a Fellow of the ABA in 1961. His 
other activities included member-
ship on the College of St. Catherine 
Lay Advisory Board, House of 
Delegates of the American Bar As-
sociation, St. Paul Athletic Club, 
Town and Country Club, and Min-
nesota Club. Donahue was born 
in Elmira, New York, and worked 
his way through St. Thomas Mili-
tary Academy and William Mitchell 
College. Since l 939, he had been 
practicing with the firm of Hoffmann 
& Donahue. He is survived by his 
widow Eileen, one son, Donald, and 
two daughters, Colleen and Kath-
leen. 
1930 
Mrs. Gretchen Marple Pracht, 
vice president of Lutheran Broth-
erhood Life Insurance Company, 
and director of public relations and 
advertising for that company where 
she has been employed since 1951, 
was appointed chairman of the 
publicity committee for the 77th 
annual meeting of the National 
Fraternal Congress of America, held 
in Chicago in September. 
1925 
Wilbert H. Steffen, 62, died No-
vember 4, 1963, in Bethesda Hos-
pital. Born in Laverne, Iowa, he 
resided in St. Paul for 42 years, 
practicing in the Pioneer Building 
in St. Paul. He was a member of 
the Minnesota and Ramsey County 
Bar Associations. Steffen is survived 
by his widow, Irene, and a son. 
1923 
District Judge Roy C. Nelsen, 59, 
and his wife died October 5, 1963, 
in Hastings Memorial Hospital as 
a result of an automobile accident 
two blocks from their home in 
Hastings, Minnesota. They were re-
turning from a Hastings-Roseville 
Ramsey High School football game 
when the accident occurred, and 
it is reported that neither came 
out of shock after the collision. 
Judge Nelsen was born in St. Paul 
in 1903, and raised in West St. 
Paul, where both he and his wife 
attended Humboldt High School. 
H e worked at the Twin Cities Na-
tional Bank in St. Paul while earn-
ing his law degree and later prac-
ticed with L. C. Shepley in South 
St. Paul. He then worked in Chi-
cago with the National City Bank, 
and then returned to St. Paul to 
practice with Maurice Moriarity. 
He was appointed deputy Dakota 
County auditor in 1935; was elected 
county andit.or in 1940, and held 
that position until appointed county 
attorney in 1948, where he re-
mained for three terms, until his 
election to the judgeship in 1960. 
He and his wife are survived by a 
daughter and three sons. 
New Full-Time Faculty ~ ember Has 
Backgrou,id inMilitaryand Civil Law 
by John Brandt 
The fall term of 1933 welcomed Mr. James 
W. Murphy to the full time faculty of William 
Mitchell College of Law. His background includes 
experience in civil, common, and military law. 
Presently he is the instructor for the Criminal 
Law and the Family Law classes, and is 
one of the advisors for the first year students. 
Born in Maspeth, Long Island, New York, he 
traveled ext e nsively 
during his preparatory 
years attending Bing-
ham Military School 
and Georgia Military 
Academy, and also at-
tended school in Mexico 
City for two years. 
Upon graduation 
from Cumberland Uni-
versity Law School in 
January , 1934, where he 
received his first LL.B., Mr. Murphy 
he went to New York City and there served as a 
law clerk. Later he worked in the legal depart-
ment of a New York title company. 
Completing Officers Candidate School in 1942, 
Mr. Murphy received an army commission. Then 
he served as a combat officer with the 87th 
Infantry Division in Europe. After V.E. Day he 
was active as a war crimes liaison officer, assisting 
in the apprehension and prosecution of the oper-
ators of the Dacau and Flosenberg concentration 
camps, and of the persons responsible for the 
Malmedy Massacre. His duties also included 
acting as defense counsel in court-martial pro-
ceedings. 
He was cited as an outstanding instructor 
while teaching at the Third Army . Intelligence 
School, and graduated from five military schools 
while in active service. At present Mr. Murphy 
is a Lieutenant-Colonel in the infantry reserve de-
tailed to the general staff with a mobilization 
assignment to the deputy chief of training, Third 
U. S. Army. 
In 1948, Mr. Murphy enrolled at the Tulane 
University College of Law as a beginning law stu-
dent as he desired to practice in Louisiana, and 
needed a working background in the civil law . 
While at Tulane he competed in the finals of the 
moot court competition, and became a member 
of the Phi Delta Phi and the International 
League. In 1951, he received his LL.B. and was 
admitted to the Louisiana Bar. 
While in New Orleans from 1951 until 1961, Mr. 
Murphy engaged in a general law practice. Dur-
ing this period he participated in numerous and 
diverse criminal proceedings while working with 
the Legal Aid Bureau, Criminal Division. 
The Murphy family moved to Tallahassee, Flor-
ida in 1961, and in October of the same year 
he was admitted to the Florida Bar. There he 
became interested in the codification of city or-
dinances. Mr. Murphy has codified the ordinances 
in thirty-one cities in nine states and is pres-
ently engaged in maintaining the New Orleans 
Code by means of quarterly supplements. The 
codification of the ordinances of Blytherville and 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, have been added 
to his busy schedule. 
Joining the faculty of Cumberland University 
Law School in 1962, Mr. Murphy was an instruc-
tor in criminal law, evidence, introduction to law 
and local government. 
Mr. Murphy and his wife Irene are the parents 
of six children ranging in age from two months to 
16 years. 
" 'Vrite and review" are the simple, but appro-
priate, words of advice which Mr. Murphy gives 
to law students. 
